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From Oblivion to 
Obsession: The Uses 
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In early 2011, two scandals related to his-
tory tormented Turkish public opinion. The 
first one was the television series Muhteşem 
Yüzyıl [The magnificent century], which re-
fers to the era of Sultan Süleyman the Mag-
nificent (1494–1566), and the second the film 
Hür Adam: Bediüzzaman Said Nursi [The free 
man: Bediüzzaman Said Nursi], which refers 
to the Muslim Kurdish scholar and political 
leader (1868–1960) of the early republican 
period who was at odds with the elite of the 
newly founded state. For more than a week, 
the productions dominated television talk 
shows and some newspaper front pages. 
The television series, in particular, triggered 
a huge uproar. Even before the series began, 
tens of thousands of people emailed the Ra-
dio and Television Supreme Council (RTÜK), 
which supervises broadcasting, complaining 
about the trailer. When the first episode was 
broadcast, an angry mob gathered in front of 
the private television station airing it. Some 
among the crowd were even dressed up in 
Ottoman attire to protest against what they 
perceived as the mistreatment of their glo-
rious forefathers. Judging from the spokes-
persons, both at the demonstrations and 
later on television talk shows, it was clear 
that the reactions had been orchestrated by 
Nationalist Action Party (Milliyetçi Hareket 
Partisi, MHP) and Great Union Party (Büyük 
Birlik Partisi, BBP) circles, namely the polit-
ical extreme right which also claims a de-
vout Muslim identity. Thus, the problem was 
twofold. On the one hand, the series insulted 
Muslim sentiment by presenting Sultan Sü-
leyman, who, let us not forget, had inherited 
from his father, Sultan Selim I (1470–1520), 
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the title of the caliph, the leader of Islam, a title that Selim himself had taken from the Mamluk dy-
nasty, whose authority he brought to an end when he conquered Egypt in 1517. How was it pos-
sible that the leader of Islam spent his time hanging around with a cup in his hand, occasionally 
filled by his servants, and indulging in the temptations of his concubines? In vain, the producers 
tried to explain that the cup did not contain alcohol but şerbet (a sweet and spicy beverage) and 
that the harem existed because the sultan made frequent use of it. Surrealistic arguments made 
it into the press. Did the sultans and caliphs drink or not?1 Did they have sexual intercourse with 
women who were not officially their wives or not?2 How does this correspond to a devout Muslim 
identity?3 All this noise boiled down to the puritan, conservative morality dominant among a large 
part of the population in Turkey today.4 The channel was even threatened with the banning of the 
series by the RTÜK, at the encouragement of Bülent Arınç, a vice-premier in the pro-Islamist Jus-
tice and Development Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, AKP) government, who raised the issue 
in parliament. The radical Islamist newspaper Yeni Şafak played a role in voicing discontent. In the 
first of a series of articles entitled Muhteşem Rezalet [Magnificent ridicule], one of Süleyman’s bi-
ographers, Okay Tiryakioğlu, explained that “The fact that Turkish TV series have in recent times 
been sold abroad has had an impact. Profit is the aim. The viewers will deliver the necessary pun-
ishment. There is even a gay scene; such nonsense is unacceptable.” The audience had a different 
view, though, as the TV series had the highest rating ever. Another historian, Mustafa Armağan, 
with respect to the same issue, claimed: “The first person who wrote that Kanuni [the lawgiver, 
a moniker attributed to Süleyman because of the legislation he introduced], used to drink was 
[the historian] Halil İnalcık. I do not know where he got the information from. Kanuni was a sultan 
who prohibited alcohol.”5 When, in the following episodes, the sultan led the Ottomans to glorious 
victories, the reactions started to dwindle. However, it was not only the political circles sensitive 
to religious issues that had a certain opinion on that. Eventually, the Republican People’s Party 
(Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi, CHP) took a position in favour of the series. Its vice-president, Engin Al-
tay, expressed his support for free expression6 and denounced what he described pejoratively as 
osmanlıcılık (obsession with the Ottomans).7 
CHP members, however, have been busy trying to defend Ataturk’s legacy. In the film Hür Adam, 
the heroic role attributed to an Islamist and Kurdish leader who openly denounced the abolition 
of the caliphate and the exclusively Turkish character of the state, caused frustration among 
Kemalist circles. Much of the criticism focused on three scenes. When Said Nursi was asked by 
a local bureaucrat to wear a European hat and remove the Islamic sarık, he said that the latter 
could only be removed together with his head. The second one was the scene where an officer 
in prison together with Said Nursi was so much affected by the latter’s words that he took off 
his uniform, lay it down and performed the Islamic prayer (namaz) on it. The third and most con-
troversial refers to a presumed meeting between Said Nursi and Mustafa Kemal. There, when 
the latter explained that they should show certain laxity over the use of alcohol and the people’s 
attire, the former got distressed and left the room, slamming the door behind him and leaving 
the future founder of the republic in contemplation. Many historians claim that such a dramatic 
exchange never actually took place.8 On the evening of the opening reception, a group of twen-
ty people protested in front of the theatre. They were supporters of the National Party (Ulusal 
Parti), a marginal, ultra-Atatürkist party. They denounced what they said was the slandering of 
Atatürk and they described Said Nursi not as a “free man” but as a “miserable/disgusting man” 










(sefil adam).9 Atatürkists also accused the director of producing an artefact of propaganda for 
the Nurcu movement, the dominant religious order both in Turkey and abroad, is inspired by the 
Risale-i Nur (Path of divine light), Said Nursi’s seminal publication, and which is led by the strong 
hand of the hugely influential Fethullah Gülen. Moreover, it was claimed that only members of 
the order watched the film.10 Adding to the tension, even before the launching of the film, the 
chief state prosecutor in Ankara filed a lawsuit against the entire production team “for insulting 
the spiritual personality of Atatürk and for inciting the people and society to endorse hatred and 
commit a crime; for slander, terrorist propaganda and activities aiming at destroying the Turk-
ish Republic”.11 On the other hand, when the culture minister, Ertuğrul Günay, a very moderate 
politician, was interviewed about it, he argued that “if in this country there is going to be democ-
racy and pluralism based on freedom of speech and thought, we should get used to films, books 
[and] publications on Bediüzzaman, Kanuni Sultan Süleyman or Atatürk”.12 
All this time, I kept asking my students whether they had seen the television series or the film. 
Most of them were appalled and wondered how I could have expected them to watch such non-
sense. My response was the aim of this paper. For a society like the Turkish one, which, every-
one agrees, used to suffer from a purposeful amnesia, it is noteworthy that everything somehow 
has now become historicised and that so many spend so much energy to claim their arguments 
in pseudo-historical debates, at a time when so many and important problems still preoccupy 
the Turkish people. Esra Özyürek, in her introduction to a relevant volume she edited, argues 
that the systematic efforts “to foster forgetfulness” did not eliminate memories altogether. Past 
experiences coexist in individual memories.13 Nowadays, as multiple means provide access to 
all sorts of information about the past, the latter is challenged and reshaped according not only 
to current political and social concerns but also those individual memories. To be sure, this is a 
much broader phenomenon and does not only apply to Turkey. As Frank Ankersmit has demon-
strated, there has been, of late, a shift from the grand schemes that provide history with mean-
ing to individual experience and subjectivity. The new subject, however, is not the self-confident 
subject of modernity but the suffering, suppressed or transgressive subject. What is crucial, 
however, is that memory does not only reflect individual experience but rather it elaborates and 
reorganises the latter so that it makes meaningful what has been part of living experience as 
well. Thus, the past is reshaped and filtered through personal experience. This is what the Dutch 
historian describes as the “sublime historical experience”.14 
More specifically, however, my purpose here is to argue that all these debates and conflicts result-
ing from the apparent unleashing of memories, images and concepts which are mediated through 
new channels of information do not eventually alienate those inspired by them from more pressing 
social and economic issues. On the contrary, they become metaphors that point directly to current 
preoccupations. In other words, they are highly political. Such overlapping, of course, is related to 
the process of transformation that Turkish society has been undergoing over the last decade as 
a result of domestic demand but also the attraction that European accession still represents for 
many, even though this has fallen in recent years. What is crucial in this process is that a society 
that used to live in the present has come to realise that, in order to move faster towards a widely 
longed-for future, it has to set the record straight as regards the past. As Meltem Ahıska, who has 
studied the Occidentalist tenet underlying the process of modernisation in Turkey, argues: “The 
http://epublishing.ekt.gr | e-Publisher: EKT | Downloaded at 21/04/2020 04:46:41 |
102
From Oblivion to Obsession
‘present’ cannot simply be reduced to a naturalised and privatised time embedded in everyday 
life or to a segment in the national-durational time of modern history that connects past and fu-
ture in the moment. The present has its own politics of time and space that is overdetermined by 
what is called history, itself a geographical-temporal representation.”15 In this sense, she is critical 
of Nilüfer Göle, who, in her works, has reflected on the notion of alternative modernity, maintain-
ing that due to the “time lag” stigmatised and internalised as “backwardness”, non-westerners are 
“alienated from their own present which they want to overcome by projecting themselves either 
to the utopian future or to the golden age of the past”.16 Commenting on the notion of the “time 
lag”, Ahıska observes that, although it looks like “a timeless element of the self-definitions of the 
non-Western”, it should yet not be essentialised and identified with a past heritage. The past itself 
is related to “the historical dynamics of modernity”.17 Such an assessment invites us to reflect on 
the equally time-bound quality of the newly emerged narratives of the past, not with respect to 
their subjective or collective character but in recognition of the fact that they are organised accord-
ing to a specific conceptual repertoire and a meaning of historical process heavily marked by the 
postnational or postmodern condition. Building on these arguments, I will briefly discuss two main 
historical topoi of Turkish public debate, namely the exchange of populations and the Armenian 
genocide. Both events represent two traumatic moments in the process of the transformation of 
the empire into a nation-state. Both refer to the fate of the non-Muslims of Asia Minor/Anatolia 
and, in this respect, to the essential other of modern Turkish identity. Finally, both have been con-
sistently silenced in the process of nation-state building. This discussion will demonstrate, I hope, 
that the engagement with personal experience, which surfaces at a time of a widespread demand 
for the democratisation of Turkish society, leads inevitably to cracks in the edifice of what has been 
described as the official narrative. Having said that, some clarification is required here. It might be 
the case that the narratives that replace the older ones reflect the contested historical past more 
accurately. However, the recent challenges might also eventually lead to a new official narrative, 
which will establish its own hegemony in the political and cultural sphere. After all, the cases I dis-
cuss do not concern but a rather limited part of the entire population. From this point of view, it can 
be argued that they have little to offer to democratisation, a process which entails, first and fore-
most, broad participation in decision-making. What is important, though, is that not only the official 
narrative but those agents that the latter has so far legitimised, namely certain state-sponsored 
elites, are placed in doubt. The demand for a new hegemony may eventually fail to integrate the 
cases I discuss here, as new elites emerge and take advantage of the current fluidity to set their 
own rules. It is clear to me, however, that large parts of the population welcome such transforma-
tions since they could not easily fit the earlier modernist project. 
Oblivion as a means of creating a new society
The Republic of Turkey from the very beginning tried to severe all bonds with the Ottoman past. 
This was not an easy task. Yet, it was a necessity. Already, by the end of the eighteenth centu-
ry, the glorious days of the empire were a remote past. If we take as a landmark the Treaty of 
Küçük Kaynarca of 1774, which gave the Russians a free hand in the Black Sea and authorised 
their intervention on behalf of the Orthodox Christian subjects of the empire, for the next centu-
ry and a half, the Ottoman Empire struggled against the symptoms of a deep crisis, which was 










fiscal, demographic but also social and political in character. When, inspired by European liber-
al ideas as well as deteriorating domestic conditions, the Balkan nations, in the geography that 
was considered as the stronghold of the empire, began achieving independence one after the 
other, the empire reacted by introducing reforms. The tensions triggered by the uneasy coexis-
tence of domestic dynamics, social and economic transformations and external intervention led 
eventually, through a protracted period of war in 1911–1922 (the Italian–Turkish, Balkan, First 
World and Greek-Turkish wars), to the demise of the empire and the emergence of a new re-
public and a new nation. The end of empires and the triumph of nation-states in the post-First 
World War period gave birth to a new paradigm both in institutional as well as cultural terms. The 
very notion of empire was discredited and was considered synonymous with authoritarian rule, 
the lack of democratic institutions, the ethnic engineering of populations, and cultural and social 
decline. This prevented for decades politicians and theorists alike from addressing the Ottoman 
Empire within the global framework of colonial experience and the subsequent independence 
movements, the Turkish one notwithstanding, as part of the anticolonial struggle. As Ahıska has 
pointed out: “In parallel to the manoeuvre of the Kemalist discourse that rendered the dynamics 
of the colonisation of the coloniser Ottoman invisible, social theory has also not fully addressed 
the complexities involved. Consequently, the Turkish ‘replica’ of modernity is either taken too lit-
erally or remains invisible in theories of modernisation, Orientalism and postcolonial criticism.”18 
It is only recently, for reasons also related to the crisis of the paradigm of nation-state domina-
tion, that interaction and continuities between the Ottoman Empire and nation-states both in the 
Balkans and the Middle East have attracted more attention.19 Moreover, eventually, Ottomanists 
broke this condition of peculiarity for the Ottoman Empire and introduced to its study the litera-
ture on Orientalism and postcolonial criticism.20
The elite of the new state thus, on the one hand, with the enthusiasm fuelled by the final victory 
in a war of independence against all odds and, on the other, as a result of the tremendous suf-
fering and loss that the collapse of the empire had entailed for everyone, set out to create not 
only a new state but also a new society and identity. Both the sultanate and the caliphate were 
abolished. The connection between the two in the public sphere but also in the popular senti-
ment was so intimate that in the “hegemonic imagination” the monarchy was identified not only 
with absolutism and authoritarianism but also with the dominance of religion. On the contrary, 
the republic was automatically equated with democracy and the rule of law. It has been very dif-
ficult for secular Turks, even today, to accept that there are several countries in Europe where 
the regime is monarchical and not republican and where democracy and human rights are 
much more developed than in Turkey. One of the main concerns of the republican elite was to 
eliminate religion from the public sphere. Religious schools (medrese) and shrines (türbe) were 
closed down and all pious foundations came under the jurisdiction of the Directorate General 
of Pious Foundations (Vakıflar Genel Müdürlüğü). Even the use of Arabic in prayer was banned. 
The language also had to be Turkified and cleansed of Arabic and Persian elements, more typi-
cal being the replacement of the Arabic with the Latin alphabet. Legislation had to be tuned with 
European law. The same applied to attire, with the compulsory introduction of the European hat 
and the ban on the fez, which had, in its turn, been introduced by Sultan Mahmut II, the master-
mind of the nineteenth-century reforms.21 Together with all this, the institutionalisation of lan-
guage and history through the foundation of relevant institutions liberated the republican elite 
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from the recent past, it was presumed, and allowed it to experiment with theories on the his-
torical provenience of the Turkish nation in antiquity and in Asia, in a different time and space.22 
All this, of course, apart from stressing the rupture and delegitimising the Ottoman past, relied 
on the vast demographic transformation that had led to the extermination through deportation 
or genocide of the non-Muslim population in Anatolia, which was destined to become the terri-
tory of the new Turkish state. 
As Keyder has pointed out, both the population exchange and the Armenian deportations played 
a key role in the formation of the nation-state ideal, which can only be understood in its inter-
relation with the aforementioned developments. In other words, “the Turkish nation was itself 
formed through this process of ethnic unmixing”.23 Keyder also demonstrates the major differ-
ence in state-citizen relations before and after the foundation of the republic. During the late Ot-
toman period and as a result of the economic and social reforms of the second half of the nine-
teenth century, the state had partly endorsed “the idea of self-limitation”, which allowed for a civil 
society to emerge based on the rule of law.24 Especially, the respect for property rights is consid-
ered an achievement in the establishment of an efficient liberal regime. The 1858 legislation, in 
particular, by way of defining individual property rights on land, opened up the Ottoman Empire 
to the world land market. However, as nationalist strife proliferated during the 1910s and the 
Greeks and the Armenians were forced to leave, it was “locally powerful or politically connected 
individuals” that took over landed property. Actually, all abandoned property was considered “na-
tionalised” and thus belonged to the state. However, many properties that were not seized by the 
state were granted by local political patrons to their clients.25 This system of distribution of prac-
tically abundant lands reversed the liberal economic policies of the late Ottoman period and this 
resulted in a suppression of a capitalist mentality. As Keyder concludes: “The republican state 
became a reincarnation of the classical patrimonial Ottoman state, dispending land and benefits 
to its trusted clients, thereby able to perpetuate its patron status above the law . . . This distribu-
tion served both to expedite the creation of a native bourgeoisie and also to make it beholden to 
the state.”26 These newly created elites were more dependent on the republican state, which is 
described as “much less accountable and therefore more autocratic and arbitrary” than the Ot-
toman one. The debates on the exchange of populations and the Armenian deportations will be 
addressed within this conceptual frame.
The exchange of populations
The experience of forced migration which determined the fate of populations in the Balkans and 
Asia Minor as an outcome of the long First World War in the region resulted not only in a reorgani-
sation of the ethnic and religious profile of large areas but also in the development of new economic 
and social conditions. These conditions necessitated the permanent resettlement and integration 
of the newly arrived Muslim populations. This integration would be achieved through state poli-
cies which functioned on two levels: on the one hand, the resettlement of areas which were aban-
doned by departing populations as well as the distribution of land holdings and appropriate equip-
ment aimed at the social and economic support of the refugees. On the other, state education and 
army conscription would accelerate their cultural assimilation. This demographic and social engi-










neering27 led to the formation of a particular sense of belonging. These populations, having under-
gone a violent process of “separation”, found themselves in a state of “liminality”, since they had 
definitely departed from their society of origin but were never fully incorporated into the receiving 
society.28 In fact, during this period the term “refugee” was used in order to differentiate all these 
populations that were displaced as the result of the breakup of the empire at the end of the First 
World War from “immigrants”, a term marking a much older practice of population movement. 
The difference in the twentieth century was that there was considerably less territory available to 
accommodate these populations than in the past and that these forced migrations attracted the 
attention of political leaders. Therefore, state policies were based on the attempt to provide new 
roots for the uprooted “since the demarcation of new nations and territorially bounded states de-
manded the allocation of particular people to particular spaces”.29 These refugees represented for 
the host countries not only a burden that they had to deal with but also a potential domestic politi-
cal threat and, until they were incorporated, a challenge to the social order. In the case of Turkey, 
the exchange aimed at the cultural homogenisation of society.30 Actually, it has been argued that 
the notorious Vatandaş Türkçe konuş (Citizen, speak Turkish) policy of the interwar period, which 
banned any language other than Turkish from public spaces, was only partly addressed to non-
Muslims: Greeks, Armenians and Jews. Its main target were the Muslim but ethnically diverse 
populations – Albanian, Bosnian, Pomak, Cretan, Circassian, Laz, Aphaz, Arab, etc. – who were 
obvious candidates for integration.31 Yet, the individual experience of national identity, as Barbaros 
Tanc has demonstrated with respect to the refugees of the population exchange, may differ from 
the official version which forms the basis for state building.32 
Recently, Turkish society has witnessed an increasing interest in the ethnic origins of the popu-
lations that originate in the Balkans and the Caucasus. Since I arrived in Istanbul eleven years 
ago, what has struck me has been the attraction that anything related to Greek culture (music, 
language, food, etc.) especially has had on a particular, educated and socially well-off part of the 
population. Initially, I was sceptical of this trend, as I thought that it was related to the recent 
Greek–Turkish rapprochement.33 Soon, however, as I became more familiar with the language 
and the people and I consulted with colleagues who specialised on similar issues, I found out 
that this interest was not only pertinent to Greek culture but it concerned anything related to 
the Balkans. In this respect, the recent political developments in the Balkans and the whole of 
eastern Europe have played a key role. During the war in Yugoslavia, in particular, many Turks, 
whose families had originally fled these very lands devastated now by warfare, saw images from 
forgotten, imagined or even mystified homelands that television brought into their homes on a 
daily basis. Moreover, a new wave of refugees, those who had already started to flee from Bul-
garia since 1986 due to the policies of Bulgarisation implemented by the last communist gov-
ernment, or the Bosnians and the Kosovars who fled from the war in their territories, brought 
Turkish public opinion into contact with an experience and a process which lay at the origin of 
the foundation of the Turkish Republic and which the state-building process had wiped out. In 
popular memory, however, these origins had never totally faded away. 
In Turkish historiography, the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey had been 
largely ignored. As Fikret Adanır has demonstrated in a relevant review article, the very few 
works that appeared in the period from the 1950s to the 1980s concerned mainly issues of geo-
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politics and demography.34 It was only during the last two decades that relevant works have 
been published, this time dealing with the contentious issues of the reception and integration 
of the refugees or the importance of their origins for self-identification. Kemal Arı has narrated 
the efforts of the administration to deal with the exchange of populations in a text which might 
be considered a rather canonical one, in the sense that it has set the framework of the debate 
but also because it reiterates certain tenets of the official ideology.35 The responses from other 
scholars were various. Mehmet Ali Gökaçtı36 focused on the political rivalries of the exchange 
and drew attention to the issue of converted Muslims, which has not been discussed much in 
the literature. Ayhan Aktar, on the other hand, has argued that the exchange of populations was 
efficiently manipulated by the republican administration in the course of the efforts to create a 
national bourgeoisie through the removal of non-Muslims.37 Finally, historiographical accounts 
have been accompanied by memoirs or travelogues which cover the period between the Balkan 
Wars and the forced migration in 1923.38 
The most recent literature regarding the issue assesses the fact that the experience of the Mus-
lims who were forced to migrate from Greece to Turkey resembles the one on the other side 
of the Aegean. Despite the long-standing belief that, due to the considerable smaller scale of 
migration and the abundance of land and property left behind by the departing Greek-Orthodox 
populations, Muslims were provided with adequate means of survival, especially in western 
Anatolia, new studies have shown that actually the problems they had to deal with were similar. 
Moreover, their cultural and social assimilation was not accomplished until much later.39 Equal-
ly important is the fact that in recent years a younger generation has taken over studying the 
way this policy was implemented in diverse localities.40 As Tutku Vardağlı has pointed out, more 
recent studies, as is the case with similar works on refugees on the other side of the Aegean, 
have followed the new trends in historiography and especially the cultural turn and the broader 
acceptance of oral history methods.41 Indeed, a series of oral history projects was launched fo-
cusing on the last survivors of that dramatic period.42 
However, the experience of these divided populations was at least in one point different from that 
of the Greek Orthodox. They lived through the first years of the republic in a period when a new 
national identity was emerging. Thus, while suppressing their particular cultural legacy, they had 
to participate on equal terms in the development of what was going to become their new identity. 
This offered them the chance to claim their own space in a nation which had yet to be created. An 
interesting field where one can trace this interweaving of state ideology and self-identification 
is literature. With respect to literature, Herkül Millas has argued that in the course of an effort 
to create a national identity based on the Turkishness of Anatolia, all irredentist discourse and 
references to lost motherlands were prohibited. Therefore, the issue was highly politicised and 
therefore “it was very difficult for authors to make literary references to the exchange without 
connecting it to some kind of political criticism directed either at the idea of forced exchange itself 
or at the practical consequences of its implementation”.43 This attitude has followed two paths. 
The most mainstream one in support of this policy is that the exchange was beneficial for the 
Turks since the state achieved national homogeneity. The other, opposing, view considers the 
Greek Orthodox as faithful Turks who belonged in Anatolia. These paths have been described by 
Millas as the ethnic and the civic one, accordingly. Moreover, for the Turkish authors, the moth-










erland used to be the land over which the Ottoman or the Turkish states had established sover-
eignty. Even when certain authors such as Yaşar Kemal are critical of the deportation process, 
they criticise the state and not individuals.44 
Parallel to the developments in the literature portrayed above, which demonstrate the plurality 
in the approaches, recently there has been a popular assessment of this transformation which 
underscores the competence of postnational collectivities to claim their own place in public cul-
ture. The normalisation of political life after the mid-1990s played a crucial role in the search 
for a new identity. As already described above, the influx of Muslim-Turkish populations from 
Bulgaria and Albanian populations from Kosovo brought to Turkish society a new awareness 
about the contemporary problems of Muslim Turks in the Balkans and led to a regeneration of 
the interest in the experience of previous migrations. Both the newcomers but also the descen-
dants of those who arrived from the Balkans became active, founding associations and seeking 
to reiterate a particular sense of identity, through rediscovering long-abandoned customs, lan-
guages and places. Without abandoning their share in Turkishness, their specific origin became 
a denominator of a different quality which allowed them to claim a heritage far richer and more 
encompassing than the one their forefathers had to assimilate to. 
Dwelling on the Greco–Turkish population exchange, Aslı Iğsız has described the emergence of 
nostalgia at two different levels: the first refers to a prenation-state “multiculturalism” or diversity 
which has become common in public representations of a community identity. This is the kind of 
nostalgia that has been dominant among the Greek Orthodox community of Istanbul since the early 
2000s, “which became emblematic of a selective nostalgia for Istanbul’s ‘past cosmopolitanism’”.45 
In that context, personal histories have created an alternative and “brought a plurality or polyphony 
to the more straightforward nationalist official historiography that contains homogenising tenden-
cies of the past and present peoples in Turkey”.46 Second, Iğsız argues, while, as has been already 
mentioned, official identity politics and nationalist historiography aimed to erase diversity and pro-
duce a “homogeneous” nation of the Muslim millet that would figure as “Turks” over a nationalised 
territory, from the 1990s onwards, there has been a trend to personalise this geography by using 
familial attributes and memories for self-identification which lead to maps of “origin”.47
However, this narrative of conviviality and of a paradise lost occasionally coalesces with an equally 
powerful nationalistic discourse, especially among migrant populations from more recent periods 
of republican history, who have cut their bonds with their homelands in the Balkans. Esra Bulut 
has studied the way “religion” affected official Turkish responses to the ethnic tensions and conflict 
that have occurred in southeastern Europe since the end of the Cold War, focusing on the conflicts 
in Bosnia Herzegovina and Kosovo, and to a lesser extent on the case of relations with the Repub-
lic of Macedonia. She has studied the intertwining of religion and Turkish national identity and the 
central place that the issue of religion occupies in politics over Turkey’s past, present and future.48 
Despite the instrumentalisation of religion, however, as Sylvia Gangloff has argued, it seems that 
the only real policy of solidarity towards these communities has been accepting, almost without 
any restrictions, refugees from the Balkans who could find shelter in Turkey.49 Yet, these discursive 
strategies have played an important role in the reappropriation in Turkey of the Ottoman past. The 
Islamist dailies, in particular, have frequently highlighted the cultural affinities between Turkey and 
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the Balkans, as well as the tolerance and peace that reigned under Ottoman rule. Thus, this dis-
course insists on “the duty of the Turks, as heirs of the Ottomans, to save oppressed Muslims”.50 
The overall issue of recent migration of Muslim populations from the Balkans to Turkey goes far 
beyond the horizons of this paper. Suffice to say, it has been tackled by anthropologists and soci-
ologists alike, occasionally with an emphasis on the policies of discrimination implemented by the 
Turkish authorities with respect to different migrant groups from the Balkans and the Middle East.51 
Yet, interestingly, this has developed alongside a discourse on reconciliation and understanding pro-
moted particularly by those descendants of the Muslims who arrived in western Anatolia during the 
exchange of populations. An example will better illustrate this claim. A decade ago, in 2001, largely 
as a result of the earthquake diplomacy between Greece and Turkey, second-generation descen-
dants of that period founded in Istanbul the Foundation of Lausanne Treaty Emigrants (Lozan Müba-
dilleri Vakfı, LMV), which, according to its own proclamation, aimed to pave the way for a debate on 
issues concerning the exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey.52 The founding mem-
bers of the association, most of them with a background of leftist activism, have persistently em-
ployed an antinationalist discourse. Following the electronic forum that the LMV established several 
years ago, which now must count more than a thousand members, has been an interesting experi-
ence. Forum members seek information about the places in Greece from where their grandparents 
originated. It is obvious that, in most cases, it is the first time they have been able to address such 
a forum and their excitement is genuine. They do not even know the present Greek name of their 
hometown or village and this is what they begin with.53 One can assume that it is the existence of 
such a forum that gives these people the incentive to publicly investigate their origins somewhere 
else and share this feeling of belonging with former compatriots. Interestingly, even if this forum 
has brought to life the notion of a “lost homeland” among the descendants of the refuges, the way 
this notion is constructed is significantly different from nationalist imaginations in Turkey and else-
where. First of all, the emphasis is not on the suffering of their ancestors due to their uprooting and 
the hard conditions they came across when they arrived in Turkey. It is mainly based on shared cul-
tural elements, such as language, food, ceremonies, etc. Secondly, the foundation has been very ac-
tive in organising trips to the places in Greece where the refugees derive from, mainly Macedonia, 
Epirus and Crete. Typically, participants later describe their impressions in relevant postings. They 
are full of emotion and surprise for the new places and the people they came across on the trip, but 
they do not, despite their dismay at the destruction of Ottoman buildings and monuments, employ a 
resentful discourse or express hard feelings against the way the locals treated them. Moreover, this 
forum has been used by historians and anthropologists, among others, who have profited from the 
interaction with the descendants of the exchangees but also responded to questions and publicised 
their research which is relevant to the purposes of the association. The LMV itself organises similar 
activities, more prominent being the two conferences entitled “Our Common Heritage”, which took 
place in Mustafa Paşa (in Greek Sinasos) and Rethymno (in Turkish Resmo) in September and Oc-
tober 2004, respectively, and was even awarded an international prize.54 
This does not mean, of course, that there is nobody among the forum’s members who thinks 
differently. The following event will illustrate the tensions which can be triggered and demon-
strates the ambiguous impact that territorial displacement can have on the formation of social 
and ethnic identities in a postnational context. On 30 January 2005, on the 82nd anniversary of the 










signing of the protocol for the exchange of populations, the journalist Deniz Madanoğlu published 
an article in the leftist newspaper Birgün which referred to scholarly works on the subject, and 
particularly one by Ayhan Aktar, who used the terms “Greek Muslims” and “Turkish Christians”, 
pointing to the fact that the exchange was based on religion and not on ethnicity.55 The terms 
Greek and Turkish in this respect referred only to nationality. This article triggered a vivid debate 
among the members of the group. Some of them, who had already accused the leadership of 
the association of being pro-Greek, for supporting the local Istanbul Greek-Orthodox population 
and ignoring the sufferings of Muslim Turks in Greece and Bulgaria, were very adamant in their 
claim that their ancestors were Turkish “through and through” (öz be öz) and nobody had the 
right to call them Greek. The debate took a nasty turn and the moderators of the group decided 
to block those who used aggressive nationalistic language.
Two years later, another interesting controversy broke out. In the spring of 2007, on the eve of 
the election for the presidency of the republic, which so much divided Turkish society, the US-
based sociologist and diasporic Muslim culture specialist Mücahit Bilici made an interesting 
claim, in an article in the pro-Islamist newspaper Yeni Şafak.56 In his view, in Turkey there were 
two countries, or two societies. On the one hand, those who were indigenous, from Anatolia and 
were ethnically Turks, and, on the other, those who came from the Balkans and the Caucasus 
and, though they were ethnically different, were eventually Turkified. In an attempt to compen-
sate for their ambiguous origins, the latter imposed, under the guise of secular Turkism, an au-
thoritarian regime over those whose Turkishness was more genuine but was also attached to 
Islam. One can see this division between the two parts even geographically, said Bilici, with the 
former dominating only in the west and partly the south of the country, where their immigrant 
forefathers had settled. Of course, the clear implication here is that the AKP and its presidential 
candidate, Abdullah Gül, represented the indigenous population whereas the opposition CHP 
party the “foreigners”. This, as schematic as it may seem – for instance, there are immigrant 
communities in other areas of Anatolia as well – is an attempt to reverse the quite dominant dis-
course of recent decades in Turkey of a division between “white Turks”, namely the westernised 
urbanised ones, and the “dark Turks”, the Anatolian mob. This discussion exceeds the limits of 
this paper, but one should not fail to mention that many of the ideological shifts that have tak-
en place recently in Turkey can be attributed to the rising bourgeois awareness of these “dark 
Anatolians” and their claim to a hegemonic role. Similar racist references occasionally appear 
with reference to particular ethnic groups, as it has recently been the case with the Circassians. 
Such an article, however, was considered by many LMV members as an attack against those 
who originated from Rumeli (the Ottoman Balkans). One of the leading figures claimed that, in 
reality, the target was Mustafa Kemal (who was himself from the Balkans) as well as modern 
democratic values and the secular and multicultural way of life. Their forefathers who had come 
with the exchange were intimidated with monikers such as infidels (gâvur) or half-infidels (yarım 
gâvur). More recently, they themselves seem to have been exposed to racism and religious fa-
naticism, being described as Salonican converts (Selanik Dönmesi) or Sabbateans (Sabetayist). 
We have seen the result of racism and religious fanaticism with the assassination of an Italian 
priest in Trabzon, the murder of Hrant Dink in Istanbul and of three missionaries in Malatya in 
2007.57 This parallel unfolding of a pluralistic perception of the past- and criminal-ethnic nation-
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alism constitute equally important aspects of the painful implementation within Turkish society 
of policies based on universal civic and human rights. Issues of identity are treated by the au-
thorities with much more sensitivity than in the past. I believe, however, that we should not lose 
sight of the fact that despite the attempt of scholars to study the phenomenon within a post-
national context, certain identities as they become accepted and integrated into the mainstream 
might become convenient elements for the elaboration of a new hegemonic discourse that will 
eventually appear to be as hierarchical as the previous one, always relying on power relations, 
albeit dominated by new divisions. For instance, nowadays one can easily imagine a govern-
ment official taking part in the commemoration of the hardships that the exchangees suffered 
as a result of state policies. The same would be out of the question for a ceremony commemo-
rating the hardships of the Armenians. There is, of course, the crucial element of difference that 
can still be accommodated among us, as in the case of the exchangees, as opposed to the one 
which cannot, as in the case of the Armenians. 
The Armenian question
References to the murder of the Turkish Armenian journalist Hrant Dink in 2007, which, apart 
from the shock it triggered internationally, was a dark chapter of the controversy that has tor-
mented public opinion more than anything else in the last past decade, are quite common. The 
Armenian question for decades had been forgotten. Then it reappeared in the 1980s as a byprod-
uct of the civil war in Lebanon. The militant Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Arme-
nia (ASALA) based there propelled the issue back onto the international agenda through carry-
ing out a series of assassinations of Turkish diplomats. As it could be expected, this infuriated 
Turkish public opinion and the already dormant prejudice against non-Muslims and especially 
Armenians resurfaced as open hostility. It was within this atmosphere that the debate on the 
Armenian genocide was generated. Turkish public opinion was caught by surprise. It was totally 
preposterous for Armenians to have the nerve to claim to be victims of Turkish atrocities when 
actually it was Turks who were assassinated by them and for no obvious reason, it was thought. 
Decades of thick silence about anything regarding the treatment of non-Muslims during the 
dramatic decade before the foundation of the republic did not allow for a dispassionate debate. 
In the last decade, there has been a lot of passion and resentment involved in this debate on both 
sides, but the issue has also expanded far beyond the level of political controversy. It is true that 
politics is always at the centre. For instance, every year, as April 24, internationally recognised 
as Armenian “Genocide Remembrance Day”, approaches, Turkish authorities as well as public 
opinion are on the alert to prevent the US president from using the term “genocide”. The same 
is true for Armenians, especially of the American diaspora, who try to push the US government 
into recognising the genocide. For the latter, these efforts are much older. Already in the 1960s, 
Armenian communities, disenchanted by the attitude of the Turkish state, were trying to push 
local parliaments into making resolutions. However, the first dramatic instance that shook Turk-
ish public opinion was in 2000 when Bill Clinton intervened to convince the House of Representa-
tives to postpone the vote on a similar resolution on the grounds that at such a precarious mo-
ment – it was the beginning of the second Intifada – it would not be expedient to alienate Turkey, 










a strategic ally in the region. Ever since, with mounting tension, a similar scenario is repeated 
every year. Not only regular newspaper columnists, but also diplomats,58 academics,59 and even 
businessmen have been mobilised in the international arena to support denialist views.60 Most 
interesting was the reactions triggered by the use in 2009 by President Barack Obama of the 
term Yerz Megern, which the Armenians themselves use to describe the genocide. It was a very 
controversial decision as it was apparently thought of as a face-saving measure. Before he was 
elected, Obama had explicitly declared that he endorsed the view that the 1915 events were a 
genocide. He had also stated in the Turkish parliament, during his first visit to a Muslim country, 
that he had not changed his views. Therefore, this was a way to avoid disappointing either side. 
The result was, of course, that neither was really satisfied. 
What is more important for our purpose here is that in recent years, another perspective has 
emerged, supported by academics, intellectuals and journalists, leftists and liberal democrats.61 
Let me briefly describe the arguments of both sides. Fatma Müge Göçek, who has studied Turk-
ish historiography regarding the Armenian question, distinguishes three periods: the Ottoman 
investigative narrative (1910s), the republican defensive narrative (1953 onwards) and the post-
nationalist critical narrative (1990s onwards).62 According to the defensive thesis, which has been 
dominant until recently, despite certain internal divisions, clashes had already broken out by the 
late nineteenth century when armed bands, under the guidance of the Armenian Hunchak and 
Dashnaksutiun organisations, terrorised not only the Ottoman authorities but also the native 
Muslim populations. The argument, therefore, is that Armenian separatists were first to begin 
exterminating Muslims and then simply faced the consequences of their actions. During the First 
World War, a large segment of Armenians living in the provinces bordering the Russian Empire 
collaborated with the advancing Russian troops against the Armenians’ own homeland. For this 
reason, and as a preventive measure of military security, it was decided that the entire Arme-
nian population of a large area would be “relocated” and resettled in safer territories. In the pro-
cess, it is claimed, miscalculations may have been made; certain cadres of the security forces 
or the army may have proved overzealous; and, along the way, the deportees may have fallen 
victim to attacks by Kurds enraged by the criminal activities of Armenian separatists. Be that 
as it may, the central government had – as much as possible, especially considering wartime 
conditions – taken measures for the safe transport and resettlement of the population. In any 
event, the archives are open and whoever wishes can study the relevant documents. Everything 
else is wild speculation. Today, those who oppose Turkey’s accession to the European Union are 
proceeding to exploit a series of obstacles that will finally force Turkey’s political leadership into 
exhausting its compliance and abandon its effort. The “Armenian genocide” stands as a major 
issue, which, among other things, swells a sense on the part of Turks of being unfairly treated 
because they are not Christians. 
As for the opposition to these views, and despite internal divisions, there is an agreement that 
the separatist activity of the Armenians never took on the mass character attributed to it, while 
their aim was not independence but rather the implementation of reforms and certain rights of 
self-government. The decision for expulsion described by the Turkish word tehcir (relocation) 
did not refer only to strategically sensitive areas. Armenian populations were also expelled from 
the regions of İzmit and Edirne (in present northwestern Turkey), which were very far from any 
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war zone. Armenians were expelled to the Syrian deserts where survival was impossible and, 
therefore, expulsion equalled death. Moreover, as early as the Balkan Wars, the Young Turks 
had put together a secret group, the Special Organisation (Teşkilat-ı Mahsusa), a precursor of 
today’s National Intelligence Organisation (Milli İstihbarat Teşkilatı, MİT), which was in charge of 
“security” and undertook all sorts of “special operations”. These measures were deemed neces-
sary as reprisals for the violent uprooting of hundreds of thousands of Muslims during the Bal-
kan Wars. But the First World War gave the Young Turks the opportunity they sought to do away 
with the Armenians, as they eventually did with Greeks and Assyrians as well. It is well known 
that there are cases of military commanders who refused to collaborate in these activities be-
cause they felt that these actions would tarnish the honour of the Ottoman army. 
The crimes against the Armenians were acknowledged in the trials against the Young Turks fol-
lowing the empire’s defeat and collapse. Furthermore, when the leadership set out to win the sup-
port of the local elders of Anatolia’s vilayets during Turkey’s war of independence, one of the first 
things they had to pledge was that seized Armenian fortunes would henceforth belong by right to 
those who had seized them. An interesting aspect has to do with the accountability of modern Tur-
key. Although the latter has utterly appropriated the Ottoman past, the fact is that all these events 
occurred within the context of an empire that was breathing its last and against which the Turks 
themselves finally won their independence. Therefore, political leaders and the academic world 
should express their regrets over these tragic events, but that should be the end of it. More im-
portant would be denouncing the mentality that led to these crimes, contributed to the repression 
of minorities and even today prevents the full democratisation of Turkish society. As regards the 
term “genocide”, there is no unanimity. Many refuse to use it while others claim that it does not re-
ally matter as long as everyone agrees on the magnitude of the disaster. There is, however, a very 
strong legal aspect to the issue. Recognition of the events of 1915 as a “genocide” would pave the 
way to reparation claims. This is the purpose of certain parts of the Armenian diaspora. The more 
radical ones go as far as claiming back land, as they have never recognised Turkish sovereignty 
over the eastern provinces, which they still describe as Western Armenia.63 
A first landmark in the process of enhancing a new awareness in Turkish society on this issue 
was the conference that took place in late September 2005 entitled “Ottoman Armenians during 
the Decline of the Empire: Issues of Scientific Responsibility and Democracy”. The event had been 
postponed from the previous May, when nationalist associations as well as government officials 
had chastised and overtly threatened the organisers, who were going to hold it at Boğaziçi Uni-
versity. Now again, two days before the conference, Istanbul’s fourth administrative court ruled 
in favour of an appeal submitted by the Great Jurists’ Association,64 which summoned the or-
ganisers to account both for their sources of funding and the participants’ academic credentials. 
The conference eventually took place, this time with the support of the government which was 
afraid of the damage that such ridicule would entail for Turkey’s European profile. 
For the two days that the conference lasted, it was the lead story on most television news bulletins, 
which featured extensive reporting and interviews on it. In this broad coverage, the interest cen-
tred not so much on what was being discussed as on what was taking place outside the meeting 
venue: protest marches, fiery speeches, slogans, eggs, tomatoes, threats from the extreme right 










or from organisations such as the Great Jurists’ Association that were clearly linked to them. But 
these groups could no longer mobilise large crowds. As for the content of the conference, it suf-
fices to say that for three days, the entire community of dissident academics, journalists and intel-
lectuals engaged themselves in a dialogue of historic dimensions. I will only refer to the admittedly 
most influential intervention, that of the journalist and publisher Hrant Dink.
As the publisher for ten years of the bilingual Turkish-Armenian newspaper Agos, he had inspired 
many Turks and Armenians with his writing, but had also annoyed the Turkish political establish-
ment. Indeed, he had been a short time before subjected to a kangaroo court trial for an article 
that allegedly “insulted” the Turkish people and their “national identity”, and given a six-month 
suspended sentence, just a few weeks before the conference. At the conference, he argued that, 
regardless of the term used to describe the tragedy of 1915–1916, nothing changed in the end, 
because those who had experienced it and transmitted their memory to the coming generations 
were not going to alter their feelings because of a particular word. But the climax in Dink’s address 
came when he recounted the story of an aged Armenian woman who had visited her birthplace 
somewhere in Anatolia and breathed her last there. Local people asked that she would be buried 
as one of their own, in a Muslim cemetery. Dink concluded: “They’re afraid that if the genocide is 
recognised, we shall have our eye on compensation and the return of land. Well, yes, we do have 
our eye on that land, but not to have it returned; rather, to be buried deep within it.”65
Hrant Dink was assassinated on 19 January 2007, in front of the building housing his newspa-
per’s offices, by a teenager carefully chosen by his instigators for his age so that he would face 
a lower punishment.66 For Turks, Armenians and others in Turkey and abroad, Dink’s assassina-
tion marked a turning point in their lives. Many saw in it the absolute failure of Turkish society to 
transform itself into a really democratic, plural one. Many, on the contrary, saw in the crowd of 
hundreds of thousands that followed his funeral the renewed hope and the possibility of change 
even at a grassroots level of public culture. The black banners these people carried at the fu-
neral were inscribed with messages such as “We are all Armenians”, “We are all Hrant Dink”, 
“For Hrant, for justice”, etc., in Turkish, Armenian but also in Kurdish, Greek and English.67 Since 
his killing, several events have been organised to honour his memory and several publications 
have appeared related to his powerful personality.
The most recent controversy with regard to the Armenian question has been the apology cam-
paign. In December 2008, a group of intellectuals, including Ahmet İnsel, Ali Bayramoğlu, Baskın 
Oran and Cengiz Aktar, initiated a campaign with the following text: “My conscience does not 
accept the insensitivity shown to and the denial of the Great Catastrophe that the Ottoman Ar-
menians were subjected to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for my share, I empathise with the 
feelings and pain of my Armenian brothers and sisters. I apologise to them.” The text was pub-
lished in several languages and within few months it was signed by more than 30,000 people, 
all over Turkey.68
This initiative is related to an international conjuncture. In February 2008, the Australian prime 
minister, Kevin Rudd, apologised to the Aborigines for the stolen generations, followed by his 
Canadian counterpart, Stephen Harper, in June of the same year, for the Indian residential school 
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system. Another example is the US government’s apology and financial reparations for the in-
ternment of Japanese Americans during the Second World War. This is the example taken up by 
Marc Mamigonian, who criticised the apology campaign.69 The author puts forth two arguments. 
He first points out that the declaration is not an official or state-sanctioned apology. This is true 
and, therefore, it cannot be compared to the above-mentioned apologies. Yet, it is interesting that 
among the authorities, the campaign triggered different reactions. On the one hand, the Turk-
ish prime minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, denounced the campaign outright, claiming that his 
ancestors had done nothing that he should be ashamed of. Then, the newly elected state presi-
dent, Abdullah Gül, commented that that was a step towards reconciliation. In a very interesting 
turn of events, though, Canan Arıtman, opposition CHP MP for Izmir and a well-known Kemalist, 
who would prove herself a racist as well, accused the president for taking such a favourable po-
sition because he himself was partly Armenian.70 In his turn, Gül, instead of using the opportu-
nity to chastise the MP for racism and give a message of civic patriotism which would not make 
any distinction between ethnicities, sought to prove that there was no Armenian blood in his 
family and he even filed a complaint against Arıtman, demanding compensation of one lira for 
moral damage.71 In general, very few politicians welcomed the campaign. Only the members of 
the Kurdish Democratic Society Party (DTP) supported it72 as well as the independent leftist MP 
Ufuk Uras. The support on the part of the Kurds becomes all the more important, as one of the 
alternatives of denialism has been to put the blame on the Kurdish tribes for the extermination 
of the Armenians, whitewashing thus the involvement of the state administration and the army. 
On the other hand, though, there is a strong sentiment among many Kurds that they helped the 
state in this dirty business only to find themselves, eventually, having the same fate.73 At any 
rate, the involvement of the political elites was very telling of certain, more general attitudes. 
The other issue that Mamigonian points out in his article regards the terminology employed.74 
On the one hand, there is no indication of the perpetrator, someone to be held responsible for 
these events. There is also no call for action, such as urging, for instance, the Turkish state to 
recognise the genocide. Instead, the entire discussion remains at the level of conscience. Even 
more important than that is the use of the term “genocide”. Turkish intellectuals use the term 
Medz Yeghern (literally “great catastrophe”) in order, according to the author and the vast ma-
jority of Armenian diaspora, to avoid the G-word. To dismiss the criticism, one of the initiators of 
the campaign, Cengiz Aktar, argued that the decision to exterminate the Armenians had a dev-
astating impact not only on the Armenians, for whom the term “genocide” would be appropriate, 
but on the region as a whole, including most certainly its Muslim populations: “In this sense, the 
Armenian genocide is a common tragedy of Anatolia, and even today what is uttered in the vil-
lages of Anatolia as part of the old stories is the tally of an unprecedented catastrophe.”75
There are more practical and material aspects to this debate as well. One is the issue of prop-
erty, more precisely what is described as Emval-i Metruke (abandoned property). This is a term 
used to describe all the property that was left behind when Armenians, but also others such as 
Greeks and Assyrians, were deported or massacred. Therefore, it is a euphemism to conceal 
the fact that this property was not deliberately abandoned. Actually, one way or another, this 
property was taken over by Muslims, mostly local notables but in some cases by the common 
people, who thus built a new future for themselves.76










The other issue regards the survivors of the genocide. Recently, a human and tragic aspect of 
the genocide has dominated part of the public debate. In the midst of despair in the long, lethal 
marches, many women left their children, infants or toddlers to the care of local Muslims. Many 
of these children were taken into orphanages by missionaries and relief workers and some 
managed later to reunite with their families.77 Many others, though, and girls in particular, were 
adopted by Muslims families, converted to Islam and lived among Turks or Kurds for the rest 
of their lives. Many of them were still alive until recently, alive but silent. In some cases, their 
families knew. In others, some might have trusted their grandchildren enough to tell them the 
truth in their final years. In the early 2000s, such stories started to surface for the first time. Ayşe 
Gül Altınay and Yektan Türkyılmaz have studied both historical and literary accounts related to 
the women survivors of the genocide. Their departure point is Fethiye Çetin’s memoir Annaan-
nem (My grandmother), as well as İbrahim Ethem Atnur’s study Türkiye’de Ermeni kadınları ve 
çocukları meselesi (1915–1923) (The issue of Armenian women and children in Turkey), both 
published in 2005 and which broke the silence on the matter.78 Conversion was a way for Arme-
nians to escape death already before 1915,79 but it turned to a widespread phenomenon in the 
following years. The discourse on the “merciful” and “humanitarian” dimension of the Turkish 
people, the authors conclude, ignores the traumatic experience of Armenian women who had to 
adopt a new identity, lived always in the fear of the possibility that the old one might be revealed, 
even though they were considered to be “dead” in both Turkish and Armenian historiography. 
I first came to learn of these stories in September 2005, at the conference on the Armenians 
mentioned earlier. In two papers, the lawyer Fethiye Çetin, author of the novel mentioned above, 
which became a bestseller in Turkey, and the medical doctor İrfan Palalı, author of the novel Tehcir 
Çocukları (The children of deportation) narrated the story of their grandmothers, who had convert-
ed to Islam, as had thousands of others: children in the vortex of the disaster.80 It is interesting that 
in the days following the conference, similar stories sprang up constantly in the newspapers. One 
had the impression that Turkish society had begun to realise the self-evident: that all those Chris-
tians who were not privileged enough to emigrate to a country with a population of their coreli-
gionists, as it was the case of Greece for the Greek Orthodox, but managed to escape the slaughter 
and hardship, were perforce incorporated into Turkish society, changing their religion and identity. 
Contrary to the narrations of survivors from the exchange of populations between Greece and Tur-
key, though, in these instances of postnational reappropriation of identities there is a very strong 
gender aspect. Out of this wave of personal confessions, especially of women who contacted Çetin, 
the latter, together with the anthropologist Ayşe Gül Altınay, carried out interviews with 25 of them 
and published the results in a book that really shook public opinion in Turkey. As the editors put it, 
“this book, more than being about 1915, is, in Hrant Dink’s words, a book about not being able to 
get out ‘of a 1915-metre deep well’”. It is a book following the deep traces that the human disaster 
of 1915 has left today to those who live in these lands.”81 This shift was also mirrored in literature. 
Elif Şafak, a young prolific writer, with an acute sensitivity on issues of suppressed identities, pub-
lished, in 2006, her novel Baba ve Piç (Father and bastard), which is based on a survival story. An 
American Armenian family and a Turkish Muslim one discover their common great-grandmother, 
an Armenian by the name of Shushan, who escaped the 1915 massacre, converted to Islam, mar-
ried a Turkish man and lived ever after as Shermin. Şafak’s heroes from both families meet in Is-
tanbul to trace the common origins.82 
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From oblivion to obsession
The narratives that have surfaced recently have not replaced the older ones, yet they have cre-
ated a space of innovative contention. Why, at this particular juncture, have scholars, politicians 
and common people decided to adopt these narratives, at a high risk in cases, is a question that 
can only partly be addressed by this paper. The 1990s witnessed a growing increase in interest 
for the past in Turkey, as elsewhere. Political changes, social developments and demographic 
reshuffling have led broader layers of the literate public to become engaged in the study of the 
past, not only out of curiosity or as a source of legitimacy for the existing order. New images 
and concepts came to dominate the media and the by then sophisticated channels of commu-
nication. Whether as a result of a instinctive reaction to the failures of modernisation, or, on the 
contrary, of an emerging civil society which was the outcome of such modernisation, individu-
als and groups started tracing their stories back to the founding years of the republic and asking 
questions about their origins as well as the role of their revered forefathers in the painful expe-
riences that marked the transformation of the empire into a nation-state. In this respect, indi-
vidual memories regenerated connections and reshuffled what is perceived as public culture. As 
a result, gradually, the state and its elites, the academic elites among them, began to lose their 
monopoly over the legitimacy to organise and interpret the past. As this past was transformed 
into experience, different groups, each with its own agenda, were given the chance to join the 
festivity of claiming their own individual origins which, they hoped, would alter their place in the 
genealogy of Turkish society, shattering thus the notion of its homogeneity. It is clear that claim-
ing a new identity is always a risky endeavour. It entails ruptures, psychological dislocation and 
even violence. It was not an easy task for the descendants of the exchange of populations to opt 
to claim their difference as a people, whose origins can be found in long-lost lands and whose 
ethnicity, hence, has been placed under scrutiny. It is even harder for those of Armenian descent 
to publicly claim such origins, let alone take a step further to “correct” the historical injustice by 
converting back to Armenianness. There are quite a number of such cases and they have occa-
sionally made the headlines. There is, however, an element of serendipity which alleviates the 
pain and the risk. Even for societies where democracy and human rights are still put frequently 
to the test, difference and particularity have lost their totally negative connotations. In a lecture 
she gave at Princeton in March 2011, Judith Butler recalled her short stay for a lecture in Ankara, 
where she saw demonstrators calling for the recognition of the Armenian genocide march next 
to transsexuals, all of them protesting against an authoritarian state. Yet, this serendipity should 
not blind us to the fact that there are levels of accepted difference. These and similar cases, of 
course, have been studied intensively by anthropologists, sociologists and political scientists. 
It has often happened, however, that in relevant accounts, the role of historicity as such is in-
strumentalised, is considered a strategy and thus lost in the name of shedding light on identity 
politics stricto sensu. I hope that this article has contributed to demonstrating that references to 
history, far from being a mechanism of legitimation, have become an arena where the present 
and the future, the private and the public, and fear and hope confront each other. This has re-
sulted in new spaces of imagination, hitherto unthinkable, that have “redeemed” entire social or 
ethnic groups from collective stigma and allow them, after having successfully achieved what 
they believe amounts to awareness, to claim with a new confidence their place in society and 
the world. This dynamic process, however, is not independent of the efforts of newly emerging 










elites to undermine the authority of older ones and, in the process, establish their own hegemo-
ny. Thus, the new spaces in public culture can be integrated into the mainstream in ways that 
are time bound, politics oriented and eventually equally contingent to circumstances as the no-
tion of the past they claim to refute. 
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which has been extensively used by the denialist camp, where it becomes clear that the state itself in-
structed the local Muslims to adopt children by offering them a measure of financial support.
79 Selim Deringil, “‘The Armenian Question is Finally Closed’: Mass Conversions of Armenians in Anatolia 
during the Hamidian Massacres of 1895–1897”, Comparative Studies in Society and History 51/2 (2009), 
344–71.
80 That very same year witnessed the publication of the memoir “M.K.” Adlı Çocuğun Tehçir anıları: 1915 ve 
Sonrası [The memoirs from the deportation of the child called “M.K.”: 1915 and its aftermath], İstanbul: 
İletişim Yayınları, 2005, prepared for publication by Baskın Oran, an influential scholar and activist. This 
is the story of an Armenian, who, after wandering for ten years, eventually managed to escape to Aus-
tralia. The author of the memoir discloses only his initials. In 2005, again, the Bir zamanlar yayıncılık 
publishing house in Istanbul published Kemal Yalçın’s Sarı gelin-Sari Gyalin. The first part of the title 
is Turkish and means “yellow/blonde bride”, while the second part Armenian and means “bride from 
the mountains”. What is more important is that the same publishing house published, in 2006, Yalçın’s 
earlier novel Seninle Güler Yüreğim [My heart laughs thanks to you], whose first publication by Doğan 
Yayıncılık in 2000 had been banned and the copies destroyed. All this information has been compiled 
by Altınay and Türkyılmaz, “Unraveling Layers”, 50.
81 Ayşe Gül Altınay and Fethiye Çetin, Torunlar, Istanbul: Metis, 2009, 11.
82 A lawsuit filed that same year against both the author and her publisher Semih Sökmen for “denigrat-
ing Turkishness” ended up in their acquittal in the first trial. The book was also published in English 
under the title The Bastard of Istanbul in 2007. 
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